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Abstract—Before deploying a new user authentication scheme,
it is critical to subject the scheme to comprehensive study. Few
works, however, have undertaken such a study. Recently, Thorpe
et al. proposed GeoPass, the most promising of a class of user
authentication schemes based on geographic locations in online
maps. Their study showed very high memorability (97%) and
satisfactory resilience against online guessing, which means that
GeoPass has compelling features for real-world use. No compre-
hensive study, however, has been conducted for GeoPass or any
other location-based password scheme. In this paper, we present
a systematic approach for the detailed evaluation of a password
system, which we implement to study GeoPass. We conducted
three separate studies to evaluate the suitability of GeoPass
for widespread use. First, we performed a field study over two
months, in which users in a real-world setting remembered their
location-passwords 96% of the time and showed improvement
with more login sessions. Second, we conducted a study to test
how users would fare with multiple location-passwords and found
that users remembered their location-passwords in less than 70%
of login sessions, with 40% of login failures due to interference
effects. Third, we conducted a study to examine the resilience of
GeoPass against shoulder surfing. Our participants played the
role of attackers and had an overall success rate of 48%. Based
on our results, we suggest suitable applications of GeoPass in
its current state and identify aspects of GeoPass that must be
improved before widespread deployment could be considered.
Index Terms—Usable security; authentication; field study;
interference study; shoulder-surfing study
I. INTRODUCTION
Users often choose passwords that are easy to remember
but also easy to guess. Both textual [1–3] and graphical
passwords [4–8] have failed to provide a viable solution to this
usability-security tension. It thus remains a critical challenge
in password research to design an authentication scheme that is
resilient to guessing attacks while offering good memorability.
Thorpe et al. [9] presented a possible breakthrough with
GeoPass in 2013. They show that this geographic location-
password scheme offers resilience to online guessing attacks
while providing very good memorability (97%, found in a
nine-day-long lab study) and high user satisfaction. While
GeoPass shows potential to possibly solve the usability-
security tension in user authentication, comprehensive study
is required before widespread deployment. In this paper, we
present the design and results of such a comprehensive study
aimed at investigating the suitability of GeoPass for real-world
applications.
A. Motivations
After decades of studies on passwords, we are still looking
for an authentication scheme that would more effectively solve
the usability-security tension in user authentication. Biddle
et al. [8] performed a comprehensive survey on 25 different
graphical password schemes and found that the research com-
munity still remains unsure of the applicability of proposed
schemes in the real world due to the lack of comprehensive
studies conducted in an organized way. Their analysis and
findings inspired us to carry out such a comprehensive study
to examine the real-world applicability of a scheme that, while
promising, had only been tested in a single lab study.
In this paper, we first spell out the research questions for the
comprehensive analysis of an authentication scheme. We then
design and implement three independent studies addressing
those research questions in an organized way. We are moti-
vated by the following facts to evaluate GeoPass through our
study design: i) GeoPass provides a potential avenue to solving
the usability-security tension in user authentication [9], and ii)
The lessons from first twelve years of graphical passwords [8]
make a point clear that unless the primary usability and
security issues of a new category of passwords are identified at
the initial phase, the later schemes in that category might have
novelty in certain aspects but would not be able to effectively
address the usability-security tension in user authentication.
So, it is important to better understand the design space for
geographical password schemes, the most recent inclusion in
password research.
B. Contributions
We identify the following research questions for GeoPass
to examine its potential for deployment:
• How usable would GeoPass be in a real-world setting?
• How do the login performances in GeoPass change over
login sessions (i.e., what is the training effect)?
• How usable would GeoPass be when users would have to
remember multiple location-passwords?
• How prominent will the interference effects be for multiple
location-passwords?
• How resilient is GeoPass against shoulder-surfing attacks?
We designed a systematic approach for addressing these
research questions using three studies: a field study to address
the first two questions, an interference study for the next two
questions, and a shoulder-surfing study for the last question.
We now present a high level overview of our findings with
references to the corresponding sections that accommodate
detailed discussions. In this paper, number of attempts and
login time, respectively refer to the required attempts and time
for successful logins only, unless otherwise specified.
1) Field study (§IV): Biddle et al. [8] note that while
field studies are challenging to perform, due to requiring a
significant investment in resources and time, they offer strong
ecological validity and the best measure of login performance
in a realistic setting. We conducted a 66-day-long field study
including 1781 login sessions from 50 participants.
Login performance. GeoPass offered satisfactory memora-
bility in our real-world context, with an overall login success
rate of 96.1% and a median login time of 19 seconds. We
analyzed the login performance distribution among users for
a detailed understanding of the usability issues (see §IV-B).
Training effect. A training effect occurs when users get
better at entering their password over time. Prior field studies
on graphical passwords lack a detailed analysis of training
effect, even though it is of particular interest to the research
community to learn how the login performances change during
a long-term field study. Through probing the change in login
performance over login sessions we demonstrate a training
effect – an overall improvement in login performance with
more login sessions (see §IV-C).
2) Interference study (§V): Biddle et al. [8] identify mul-
tiple password interference as a major usability concern and
make a surprising discovery that only three out of 25 graphical
password schemes have been evaluated with an interference
study. While Biddle et al. [8] highlight the importance of
interference studies, they also report that how to best evaluate
multiple password interference still remains an open issue.
In this case, prior interference studies on graphical pass-
words showed the memorability for multiple passwords, but
they failed to demonstrate the precise impact of interference
(see §VIII for further discussion).
We performed a three-week-long interference study in a lab
setting, where the participants had to remember four different
location-passwords, one for each of four different accounts.
Interference effects. We identified that interference effects
played a major role in the failure of login attempts when users
had to remember multiple location-passwords. In this case, the
overall login success rates were 58% in login 1 (one week after
registration) and 67% in login 2 (two weeks after registration)
(see §V-B).
Our detailed examination on login failures reveals the pre-
cise impact of interference. 44.8% of attempts in login 1 and
38.2% of attempts in login 2 failed because of interference
effects (see §V-C). We investigated both accurate and non-
accurate interferences for an in-depth analysis of interference
effects.
Correlation with distance. Some participants created mul-
tiple geopasses around a particular area, perhaps to aid mem-
orability. While a large fraction of login failures occurred
because of interference effects, we investigated whether par-
ticipants were confused by geopasses that were geographically
close. Our analysis reveals that the interference effect between
a pair of geopasses had no correlation with the distance
between them (see §V-D).
Geopass creation behavior. Through an anonymous paper-
based survey, we identified the types of locations (e.g., home,
workplace, etc.) participants chose as their location-passwords.
We measured the distances between each given participant’s
geopasses to find the likelihood of creating geographically
close location-passwords. We also discuss, based on our
findings, possible geopass creation strategies for high security
accounts, such as online bank accounts (see §V-E).
3) Shoulder-surfing study (§VII): To examine the vulnera-
bility of GeoPass to shoulder-surfing attacks, we conducted a
lab study with 30 participants playing the role of attacker.
Success rate. The overall success rate in shoulder surfing
was 48%, which suggests that GeoPass is highly vulnerable
to the attack (see §VII-B). We analyzed the login attempts of
unsuccessful participants. Our findings suggest that the success
rate could further increase if they were allowed more login
attempts, since the clicked locations of the participants who
failed to log in successfully were very close to the actual
location-password in several cases (see §VII-C).
Recording materials. Using the Google map interface on
a tablet PC represents a tech-savvy method to record authen-
tication secret during shoulder surfing, while pen and paper is
traditionaly used in shoulder surfing studies. Participants in our
study preferred pen and paper to using a tablet (see §VII-D).
Navigation strategies. We analyzed the impacts of naviga-
tion strategies on shoulder surfing and figured out that how a
user navigated to the location-password, either by panning or
typing the full address, did not affect the success rate of the
attack (see §VII-B).
4) Overall recommendation: Based on the results of our
three studies and detailed analysis, we believe that GeoPass
as proposed by Thorpe et al. [9] is not yet mature enough
for wide-scale deployment. In particular, we examine the
scenarios in which it may be useful and identify the aspects
for future improvement (see §VIII-B).
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we give a brief overview of notable textual
and graphical password schemes, in which we highlight why
existing schemes are insufficient. We then discuss geographic
location-passwords and their potential.
A. Textual Password Schemes
Traditional passwords. Traditional user-chosen textual
passwords are fraught with security problems [10, 11] and
are especially prone to password reuse and predictable pat-
terns [12, 13]. Different password restriction policies have
been deployed to get users to create stronger passwords.
Shay et al. [14] report, however, that such policies do not
necessarily lead to more secure passwords but do adversely
affect memorability in some cases.
Mnemonic passwords. Kuo et al. [15] studied user-chosen
passwords based on mnemonic phrases, which are slightly
more resistant to brute-force attacks than traditional pass-
words. However, mnemonic passwords are predictable when
users create passwords from common phrases. The vulnera-
bility to guessing is further increased when attackers use a
properly chosen dictionary [15].
System-assigned password. System-assigned random tex-
tual password schemes are more secure but fail to provide
sufficient memorability, even when natural-language words are
used [1, 2]. Wright et al. [2] compared the usability of three
different system-assigned textual password schemes: Word
Recall, Word Recognition, and Letter Recall. None of these
had sufficient memorability rates.
PTP. Persuasive Text Password (PTP) [3, 16] is a hybrid be-
tween user-selected and system-assigned passwords, in which
the user first creates a password and PTP improves its security
by placing randomly-chosen characters at random positions in
the password. Unfortunately, the memorability for PTP is just
25% when two random characters are inserted [3].
B. Graphical Password Schemes
Graphical password schemes can be divided into three
categories [8], based on the kind of memory leveraged by the
systems: i) Drawmetric (recall-based), ii) Locimetric (cued-
recall-based), and iii) Cognometric (recognition-based).
Drawmetric. The user is asked to reproduce a drawing
in this category of graphical passwords. In Draw-a-Secret
(DAS) [4], a user draws on top of a grid, and the password
is represented as the sequence of grid squares. Nali and
Thorpe [17] have shown that users choose predictable patterns
in DAS. BDAS [18] intends to reduce the amount of symmetry
in the user’s drawing by adding background images, which
may introduce other predictable behaviors such as targeting
similar areas of the images or image-specific patterns [8]. DAS
and BDAS have recall rates of no higher than 80%.
Locimetric. The password schemes in this category, includ-
ing Passpoints and Cued Click-Points (CCP), present users
with an image and have users select points on the image as
their password. Dirik et al. [19] developed a model that can
predict 70−80% of the user’s click positions in Passpoints. To
address this issue, Chiasson et al. proposed Persuasive Cued
Click-Points (PCCP) [20, 21], in which a randomly-positioned
viewport is shown on top of the image during password
creation, and users select their click-point within this viewport.
The memorability for PCCP was found to be 83 − 94%. In
a follow-up study, Chiasson et al. [22] found predictability in
users’ click points and indicate that the hotspot issue is still a
security concern for PCCP.
Cognometric. In this recognition-based category of graph-
ical passwords, the user is asked to recognize and identify
their password images from a set of distractor images. Pass-
faces [7, 23] is a commercial cognometric system in which
users select one face among a panel of nine distractor faces
and repeat this over several panels. Davis et al. [6] have found
that users select predictable passwords on Faces (their own
version of Passfaces), biased by race, gender and attractiveness
of faces. As a result, the commercial Passfaces [7] product
now assigns a random set of faces instead of allowing users
to choose. However, Everitt et al. [24] show that users have
difficulty in remembering system-assigned Passfaces.
Thus, despite a large body of research, it remains a critical
challenge to build an authentication system that offers both
high memorability and guessing resilience.
C. Geographic Location-Password
In 2013, Thorpe et al. [9] presented their study of a
promising scheme for user authentication called GeoPass,
which is based on selecting a location in an online map.
They showed that the scheme offers high memorability and
resistance against online guessing attacks, which suggests that
GeoPass may offer a solution to the usability-security tension
in password schemes.
GeoPass has the interesting property that it involves el-
ements of recognition, cued-recall, and pure recall [9],
while a graphical password is generally categorized either
as a recognition-based, recall-based or a cued-recall based
scheme [8].
In GeoPass, the user’s password is a location on a digital
online map (Google Maps). This secret location, known both
as the location-password and just geopass1, is selected by
the user at registration by right-clicking on the map. GeoPass
leverages the map display, search, zoom, panning, and marker
placement features provided by the Google Maps API.
The search bar helps to make navigation faster by enabling
the user to type the name of a place and by providing a drop-
down menu suggesting the locations in which the searched
item may appear. Zooming and panning are also enabled via
the Google Maps API. Using the convention that a higher
numbered zoom level represents being zoomed in closer, the
initial zoom level is 2, and GeoPass allows the user to click on
a location at a minimum zoom level of 16. A successful login
requires the users to click within a 21x21 pixel box around
the location-password they had set. We refer readers to Thorpe
et al.’s paper [9] for in-depth discussion on the features of
GeoPass.
Thorpe et al. [9] conducted a nine-day-long user study on
GeoPass with three sessions: two in a lab-setting and one
online. The login success rate was 97%, and the median login
time was found to be no greater than 30 seconds [9]. Their
security analysis [9] showed that the theoretical password
space for GeoPass is 236.9, such that only 11% of online
guessing attacks might be successful after allowing for 216
guesses. In this respect, reasonable lockout rules [25] should
make GeoPass sufficiently resilient against such attacks. The
user feedback on GeoPass was encouraging, and a number of
users showed interest to use the scheme in real life [9].
Other schemes. There are two other schemes that use
map locations as an authentication secret: one proposed by
Spitzer [26] and another one called PassMap [27]. PassMap
1in lowercase to avoid confusion with the system name
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Fig. 1. Field Study: Number of logins
requires the user to choose two locations and the scheme by
Spitzer [26] requires five or seven locations at different zoom
levels to be selected as the location-password. Thorpe et al. [9]
have shown that GeoPass is more usable than other digital-
map-based schemes [26, 27] because of its requirement to
click on a single location and normalized error tolerance to
a given zoom level. The login success rate in GeoPass (97%)
was found to be higher than that in PassMap (92.59%).
III. SIGNIFICANCE TESTS
To analyze our results, we use statistical tests and consider
results comparing two conditions to be significantly different
when we find p < 0.05. We selected statistical tests based on
their appropriateness for the corresponding datasets. In this
brief section, we give an overview of the statistical tests that
we use in our analysis.
When comparing two conditions where the variable is at
least ordinal, we use a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the
matched pairs of subjects and a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
for unpaired results. Wilcoxon tests are similar to t-tests, but
make no assumption about the distributions of the compared
samples, which is appropriate to the datasets in our conditions.
Whether or not a participant successfully authenticated is a
binary measure. So, we use either a McNemar’s test (for
matched pairs of subjects) or a chi-squared test (for unpaired
results) to compare login success rates between two conditions.
IV. FIELD STUDY
In this section, we describe the procedure and results of the
field study, which reveals the login performance of users in a
real-world setting and the changes in login performance over
the login sessions.
TABLE I
Field Study: REGISTRATION TIME (SECONDS)
Mean Med SD Max Min
203 154 162 593 25
TABLE II
Field Study: OVERALL LOGIN PERFORMANCE [LOGIN SESSIONS: 1781,
LOGIN SUCCESS RATE: 96.1%]
Mean Med SD Max Min
No. of Attempts 1.3 1 1.3 22 1
Login Time (sec.) 32 19 59 997 5
A. Study Design
We conducted the field study on a computer science class
with both undergraduate and graduate students. Students were
informed verbally in lecture that the scheme was not developed
by the instructor. We developed a website to let the students
access course study materials and their grades on exams
and assignments. Upon collecting the students’ names from
the instructor, a username (firstname.lastname) was
assigned to each user, and we asked them to create the geopass
for their accounts. To protect against unauthorized access, the
usernames of the students were pre-stored in the system so
that only students in this class could create accounts, one per
username. Table I shows the results for registration, where
maximum, minimum, median and standard deviation are cited
as Max, Min, Med, and SD, respectively.
The GeoPass system was active for 66 days (Oct. 15 to Dec.
20) during the Fall 2013 semester. Out of 57 students in this
class, 50 students (10 women and 40 men with a mean age
of 24) gave positive consent to use their login information for
the study and signed consent forms before participating in an
anonymous paper-based survey at the end of semester. They
were compensated with extra credit in a class assignment for
participating in this survey, and an alternative assignment was
offered for those who did not want to participate.
Our system recorded 1781 login sessions performed by
these 50 users during the study. The users could log in at
anytime from anywhere using their desktop or laptop comput-
ers. 56% of users reported that in most cases, they logged in
from a computer with a 15-inch screen, while the screen sizes
of computers for other users varied from 12 to 27 inches.
During authentication, we started counting login time when
the Google map interface was shown to the user after entering
her username. A successful attempt required to the user to en-
ter both her username and geopass correctly. An unsuccessful
attempt refers only to sessions where the username was correct
but the geopass was selected incorrectly.
To reset a geopass, the participant had to send an email to
the experimenter from her .edu email account, and in response
she would receive a link through email to create a new geopass.
A few participants had to reset their geopasses within the first
few days of the study because of a technical problem in our
system. The results reported in this paper do not include any
login sessions for these users performed prior to these resets,
since the corrupted data had to be deleted while fixing that
technical issue. Thereafter, no participant reset her geopass
during the study.
Limitations. Our participants were generally young and
university educated, so our findings may not generalize to the
entire population of Web users.
B. Overall Login Performance
In our field study, we recorded 1781 login sessions, where
a single login session (or login) by a participant may in-
clude multiple attempts to authenticate successfully. A login
is marked as unsuccessful when the participant leaves the
authentication webpage after failing to click on the correct
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Fig. 2. Field Study: Login performance (50 participants)
location. To find the full distribution of the number of attempts
needed for a successful login, we did not limit the number of
attempts a participant can make during a login session. One
attempt refers to right-clicking at a location on the Google
map.
Participants performed 35.6 logins on average (minimum:
8, maximum: 130). Figure 1 shows the number of logins by
the participants, where a (x, y) point represents the percentage
of participants (y%) who conducted at least x logins, either
successful or unsuccessful.
We measured the average login performance of each par-
ticipant in her login sessions (see Figure 2) and calculated
the overall login performances for all of the participants over
1781 login sessions (see Table II). The overall login success
rate was 96.1%. Users required 1.3 attempts (on average) per
successful login, while the average login time was 32 seconds,
with a median of 19 seconds.
1) Login performance distribution among users: Fig-
ures 2(a), 2(b), and 2(c) show empirical CDFs (ECDFs) of
login performance statistics taken over the users in our study
(in Figure 2(a), the x-axis is shown with increasing success
rates and thus appears reversed).
Figure 2(a) shows login success rates among participants.
48% of participants had a 100% login success rate, 82% had at
least a 90% success rate, and 96% had at least an 80% success
rate. The minimum success rate for any participant was 70%.
Figure 2(b) shows the average number of attempts per suc-
cessful login among the participants. 90% of participants made
at most two attempts on average to authenticate successfully,
and 100% of participants logged in successfully within five
attempts on average.
Figure 2(c) shows the average login time among partici-
pants. The average login time was 20 seconds or less for 18%
of participants and 30 seconds or less for 46% of participants.
The median login time was 15 seconds or less for 22% of
participants and 30 seconds or less for 76% of participants.
C. Training Effects
To determine the extent of any training effects for GeoPass
users in a real-world setting, we analyzed the change in
login performance over login sessions. The results are shown
in Figure 3. We illustrate the results at xth login session
(x = 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31), where there are five login sessions
between each value of x. Here, we consider up to the 31st
login session, since using the next value of x (37) would
make for a rather small sample size (15 users). For significance
tests in this section, we used Wilcoxon signed-rank tests for
matched pairs of subjects and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests
for unpaired results.
We note that the sample size changes (shrinks) for each
successive value of x > 7. As we are looking for a training
effect, we may be concerned about the remaining population
of users being more adept at using the system than those who
have stopped logging in. Our results, however, show that the
number of login sessions performed by a participant did not
have a strong correlation with her login success rate (r =
0.18), number of attempts for successful login (r = −0.11), or
login time (r = −0.21). As the strongest training effects that
we found occurred by session x = 7, this is not a surprising
result.
A given (x, y) point in a graph in Figure 3 represents the
average login performance (y) of the participants calculated
over the xth login session of each individual. Note that the
xth login session of any given participant likely occurred at
a different time than that of other participants. The number
of participants varied for different values of x (login session),
since the participants performed different numbers of logins
(see Figure 1). Table III represents the number of participants
in each of xth login sessions.
Login Success rate (Figure 3(a)). The login success rate
was 84% in the first login session and 94% in the 7th login
session, which was increased to 100% by the 13th login
session. The login success rate remained at 100% in the 19th,
25th, and 31st login sessions.
Number of attempts (Figure 3(b)). The mean number of
attempts for a successful login was 1.79 in the first login
session, which decreased to 1.19 in the 7th login session.
Except for the 19th login session, the mean number of attempts
for successful logins decreased over the login sessions as
shown in Figure 3(b). The median number of attempts for
successful logins remained constant over the login sessions.
The results for significance tests show that the number of
attempts for successful login in the 7th (V = 68.5, p < 0.05),
13th (W = 795.5, p < 0.01), 19th (W = 628, p < 0.01),
25th (W = 475.5, p < 0.01), and 31st (W = 333.5, p <
0.01) login sessions were significantly less than that in the
first login session. We did not find significant difference in
number of attempts between any other pair (x, y) of login
sessions (x, y = 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31).
Login time (Figure 3(c)). The mean login time was 91 sec-
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Fig. 3. Field Study: The change in login performance over the sessions
TABLE III
Field Study: NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE xth LOGIN SESSION
x 1 7 13 19 25 31
Participants 50 50 44 35 28 21
onds in the first login session, which decreased to 37 seconds
in the 7th login session. As shown in Figure 3(c), mean and
median login times decreased over the login sessions, where
we find an exception at the 25th login session.
The results for significance tests show that login time in
the 7th (V = 266, p < 0.001), 13th (W = 430, p < 0.001),
19th (W = 245, p < 0.001), 25th (W = 228, p < 0.001), and
31st (W = 114, p < 0.001) login sessions were significantly
less than that in the first login session. We also found that
login time in the 13th (W = 867.5, p < 0.05), 19th (W =
592, p < 0.01), 25th (W = 473.5, p < 0.01), and 31st (W =
267.5, p < 0.001) login sessions were significantly less than
that in the 7th login session, and login time in the 31st login
session was significantly less than that in the 13th login session
(W = 319.5, p < 0.05). No significant difference in login
time was found between any other pair x, y of login sessions
(x, y = 1, 7, 13, 19, 25, 31).
V. INTERFERENCE STUDY
In this section, we discuss the procedures used in our
interference study and then provide the study results, which
show login performance when using multiple geopasses and
the corresponding interference effects.
A. Study Design
We conducted the interference study in a course on com-
puting basics. Out of 60 students in this class, 18 students
(11 women and 7 men) participated in our study. Their mean
age was 23. The subjects were compensated with extra credit
in a class assignment for participating in this study, and an
alternative assignment was offered for those who did not
want to participate. No student participated in both field and
interference studies.
1) Procedure: The three-week-long interference study in-
cluded three sessions, which we will call sittings, each held
one week apart. The class included a two-hour lab session each
week, where each student used a desktop computer meant for
exercises with common productivity software packages. The
lab exercises could be done relatively easily for most students,
leaving time for us to conduct sittings during the lab sessions.
Each sitting took no more than 30 minutes.
Haque et al. [28] classify websites into four categories: i)
financial (e.g. WellsFargo.com), ii) identity (e.g. Gmail), iii)
content (e.g., Netflix, Weather.com), and iv) sketchy (unfamil-
iar sites offering coupons and often attracting transient user
relationships). We built one website from each of the above
categories and refer to them in this paper as bank, email,
movie, and deals, respectively. Each site was equipped with
GeoPass for user authentication and could be accessed from
any computer through the Internet. The sites were designed to
have the images and layouts from familiar commercial sites,
with the exception of the deals site, which was designed to
look more questionable.
Before the first sitting, we contacted students in the class
through email, giving them an overview of our study and
asking them about their interest to take part in the study. 18
students responded positively. We then collected their names
and established a username (firstname.lastname) for
each participant to be used for their four accounts.
In the first sitting, we gave the participants an overview of
GeoPass and asked them to create a location-password for each
account. To best study interference effects, the participants
were asked to create a distinct geopass for each account. In
the second and third sittings, users were asked to log into their
four accounts from the lab computers. We refer to these sittings
as login 1 and login 2, respectively. The participants could log
into the sites in any order. We conducted an anonymous paper-
based survey at the end of third sitting.
If a participant failed to log into an account after five
attempts, she was shown a button that she could use to view
her geopass. She was also allowed to make more attempts
without viewing her location-password. Once the button was
clicked to view the geopass, however, the participant was no
longer able to attempt to log into that account for that sitting.
2) Limitations: As the study was performed in a lab setting,
we were only able to gather data from 18 participants. The
participants were young and university educated, which may
not generalize to the entire population.
We followed the method of Chiasson et al.’s extensive study
on interference [11], in which all the passwords were created
in the same sitting. This means, however, that registration is
not similar to real life, in which the geopasses would likely
be created over time and possibly in different contexts, e.g. in
TABLE IV
Interference Study: LOGIN PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTICIPANTS
Accounts Sitting
Success Number of Attempts Login Time
Rate (%) Mean Med SD Max Min Mean Med SD Max Min
Bank login 1 56 5.2 3 7 26 1 99 91 49 188 41
login 2 61 3 2 2.2 7 1 79 60 60 203 12
Separate
Email login 1 78 2.1 1 1.9 6 1 51 40 43 146 11
View login 2 78 3 1 4.7 18 1 35 37 21 72 8
Movie login 1 56 1.6 1 1.6 6 1 33 28 22 76 9
login 2 72 2.7 1 2.6 8 1 25 24 11 44 10
Deals login 1 44 2.5 1 3.2 10 1 57 36 49 167 10
login 2 56 4 1.5 4.8 16 1 47 35 30 99 14
Combined login 1 58 2.8 1 4.2 26 1 59 43 47 188 9
View login 2 67 3.1 1 3.7 18 1 45 35 39 203 8
different rooms or with different computers. Addressing all of
these issues would be challenging for such a study.
B. Login Performance
Each of the 18 participants logged into four accounts in
both login 1 and login 2, making a total of 72 login sessions
in each sitting. We examine the login performance both for
each of the four account types separately (the separate view)
and for all four account types combined (the combined view).
The results for login performances are shown in Table IV.
Login Success rate. In the combined view, the overall login
success rates were 58% in login 1 and 67% in login 2 (see
Table IV). We use a McNemar’s test to compare login success
rate between login 1 and login 2, since we get matched pairs
of subjects in this case. Our analysis shows that login success
rate did not differ significantly between login 1 and login 2 in
either the combined view or the separate view.
Number of attempts. The mean number of attempts for
successful logins were 2.8 in login 1 and 3.1 in login 2 for
combined view, while the median was 1 in both sittings (see
Table IV). We do not get matched pairs of subjects while
comparing two sittings in terms of login time or number
of attempts for successful logins, since some participants
who logged in successfully in one sitting failed in the other
sitting. So we use a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to evaluate
the differences in number of attempts for successful logins
between login 1 and login 2.
In the combined view, we did not find a significant differ-
ence in the number of attempts for successful logins between
login 1 and login 2. However, in the separate view for bank
accounts, the number of attempts for successful logins in login
1 was significantly higher than that in login 2 (W = 110,
p < 0.01). For the other account types, the differences between
login 1 and login 2 were not significant.
Login time. In the combined view, the mean times for
successful logins were found to be 59 seconds in login 1 and
45 seconds in login 2, while the medians were 43 seconds
in login 1 and 35 seconds in login 2 (see Table IV). We use
a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to evaluate the differences in
time for successful logins between login 1 and login 2. We did
not find any significant difference in the time for successful
logins between login 1 and login 2 in either the combined
view or the separate view.
C. Interference Effect
In each sitting, every participant was asked to complete four
login sessions, each for one account. We refer to the account
corresponding to current login session as the visible account
and refer to the other three accounts as invisible accounts.
For example, when a participant attempts to log into the bank
account, the bank account is visible, while email, movie, and
deals accounts are considered invisible. Thus, a successful
login requires the user to select the geopass of the visible
account. Because of interference effect, a user may make
mistakes and click on the geopass of an invisible account.
Table V shows the summarized results for interference effects
in our study.
We did not restrict the number of attempts a participant
can make for a successful login, and clicking at a location
other than the geopass of the visible account results in an
unsuccessful attempt. We figure out the impact of interference
on the failure of an attempt in the following way: For each
unsuccessful attempt, we measure the distances (in kilometers)
between the clicked location and her geopasses for each of the
four accounts. In this way, we find the account whose geopass
is closest to the clicked location. If the closest account is the
visible account, we assume that interference did not impact
the failed attempt, and we show this as non-interference in
Table V. If the closest account is an invisible account, we
say that the attempt fails because of the interference effect. In
this case, if the clicked location is a correct geopass for the
invisible account, we classify it as accurate interference, and
otherwise we call it non-accurate interference.
Our results (see Table V) show that 14.9% of 282 attempts
succeeded in login 1, while 44.8% attempts failed because
of interference effects (considering both accurate and non-
accurate interferences). In login 2, out of 309 attempts 15.5%
were successful, and 38.2% attempts failed because of inter-
ference effects.
We used a Wilcoxon signed-rank test to evaluate the dif-
TABLE V
SUMMARY OF THE INTERFERENCE EFFECT
Accounts Sitting
Failed Attempts (%)
Total Successful Interference Non-Interference
Attempts Attempts (%) Accurate Non-Accurate
Bank login 1 101 9.9 7.9 39.6 42.6
login 2 85 12.9 0 48.2 38.8
Email login 1 50 28 2 32 38
login 2 67 20.9 0 29.9 49.3
Movie login 1 55 18.2 1.8 49.1 30.9
login 2 61 21.3 1.6 36.1 41
Deals login 1 76 10.5 5.3 38.2 46.1
login 2 96 10.4 5.2 30.2 54.2
Overall login 1 282 14.9 5 39.8 40.4
login 2 309 15.5 1.9 36.3 46.3
ference between login 1 and login 2 in terms of the number
of failed attempts because of interference effects, as we have
matched pairs of subjects in our dataset. Considering both
accurate and non-accurate interferences, we didn’t find any
significant difference between login 1 and login 2 in the num-
ber of failed attempts due to interference effects (V = 422.5,
p = 0.72). No significant difference was found either between
login 1 and login 2 if we consider only accurate interference
(V = 14.5, p = 0.36) or only non-accurate interference
(V = 369, p = 0.98).
D. Correlation between Distance and Interference Effects
We examined the city 2 of each geopass as indicated by
the Google Maps API and found that 27.8% of participants
chose all four geopasses in the same city, while 16.7% of
participants created three location-passwords in the same city
and one in a different city (see Table VI). We also measured
the distance (in kilometers) between each pair of geopasses
of a participant. Since each participant created four location-
passwords, we had six pairs of accounts for each participant
and 108 pairs in total for 18 participants. Figure 4 shows an
empirical CDF (ECDF) for the distances between geopasses
of each pair of accounts, where over one-quarter (27.8%) of
geopass pairs were within 2.0 km.
It is possible that a user who selects two geopasses near
each other may confuse them, leading to interference effects.
We thus seek to determine whether the interference effect
between a pair of accounts had any correlation with the
distance between corresponding pairs of geopasses.
TABLE VI
Interference Study: USER BEHAVIOR IN CREATING MULTIPLE
LOCATION-PASSWORDS
Same Country Same City
# geopasses 4 3 4 3 2 None
Users (%) 89.9 11.1 27.8 16.7 11.1 44.4
2The city can mean a city, town, or smaller jurisdiction, and different
towns in the same metropolitan area will be considered distinct.
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Fig. 4. Interference Study: Distances between geopasses for each pair of
accounts
To measure the interference effect between two accounts
for a given participant, such as bank and email, we counted
the number of failed attempts T1 for which bank was the
visible account and email was the invisible account with the
closest geopass (compared to the geopasses of the movie and
deals accounts) to the clicked location. We then calculated T2
representing the number of unsuccessful attempts for which
email was the visible account and bank was the invisible
account with the closest geopass to the clicked location. Here,
T = T1 + T2 refers to the interference effect between bank
and email accounts for this participant. We also measured the
distance D (in kilometers) between the location-passwords for
the bank and email accounts of the given participant. In this
way, we measured D and T for each pair of accounts of every
participant and then calculated the correlations between D and
T . However, we didn’t find any strong correlations in this
respect either in login 1 (r = 0.12) or in login 2 (r = 0.02).
We also considered accurate interference to find correlations
with the distances between pairs of geopasses. The process of
calculation was same as described above except for T , which
now represents the number of attempts where the clicked
location accurately represents the location-password of the
corresponding invisible account (email or bank in the above
example). In this respect, no strong correlation was found
either in login 1 (r = 0.02) or in login 2 (r = 0.0002).
Also, for non-accurate interference, we did not find any strong
correlation: login 1 (r = 0.12), login 2 (r = 0.02).
Thus, the participants did not appear to be confused by
geopasses that were close together on the map.
E. Banking Geopass Selection
In real life, it would be difficult to restrict users from
choosing their current or previous home, school, or work
locations as geopasses. Instead, it would be realistic to suggest
for security reasons that choosing such places may make
their geopasses vulnerable to targeted guessing attacks. So we
verbally gave this simple security suggestion to the partici-
pants at the beginning of the study but did not restrict them
from choosing their home, school, or workplace as location-
passwords.
In the post-experiment questionnaire at interference study,
we asked participants, “Which of your four geopasses is the
strongest one against guessing attack?”. In response, most
of the participants (61%) picked their geopass for the bank
account. We also found that for the majority of participants
(55.6%), geopasses for bank accounts refer to their cur-
rent/previous home, schools, or workplaces (see Table VII),
which are generally more vulnerable to guessing attacks than
geopasses that do not represent a publicly-known location
(e.g., My favorite place).
To explain these apparently conflicting results, we could say
that the participants did not carefully judge the strength of their
geopasses. However, we also offer an alternative explanation.
First, we note some additional results from the interference
study. For each sitting (e.g., login 1, login 2) in the study,
we compared each pairs of accounts in terms of login success
rate (McNemar’s test), number of attempts for successful login
(Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test), and login time (Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test). The appropriateness of using McNemar’s
test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test are explained in §III.
TABLE VII
Field and Interference Studies: RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION: “WHICH
OF THE FOLLOWING LOCATIONS CORRESPONDS TO YOUR GEOPASS?”
[CUR: CURRENT, PREV: PREVIOUS, BK: BANK, EM: EMAIL, MV: MOVIE,
DL: DEAL, WP: WORKPLACE]
Locations
Participants (%)
Field Interference Study
Study Bk Em Mv Dl
Cur/Prev home 34.7 22.2 22.2 27.8 16.7
Cur/Prev school/wp 10.2 33.4 27.8 11.1 16.7
Place of birth 0 0 0 11.1 0
A visited place 6.1 5.6 22.2 16.7 16.7
My favorite place 22.5 11.1 5.6 5.6 27.8
A historical place 4.1 0 0 0 0
An unusual place 10.2 5.6 0 5.6 0
None of the above 12.2 22.2 22.2 22.2 22.2
For login success rate, we did not find any significant dif-
ference between any pair of accounts. However, participants
required significantly higher login times for bank accounts in
comparison to other accounts in login 1: email (W = 110,
p < 0.05), movie (W = 92.5, p < 0.01), deal (W = 66,
p < 0.05), and in login 2: email (W = 114, p < 0.05), movie
(W = 118.5, p < 0.01). The number of attempts was also
significantly higher for bank accounts than email (W = 105.5,
p < 0.05) and movie (W = 84.5, p < 0.01) accounts in login
1.
Since bank passwords are required to be both memorable
and secure, participants might have chosen geopasses that refer
to highly memorable locations and then picked less obvious
points around that location to increase the security of their
authentication secrets. We speculate that such a strategy might
have led to the higher login times for bank accounts, as it
is generally easier and less time-consuming to find a clear
landmark on the digital map.
We note that we did not have a way to validate this
explanation through our anonymous survey.
VI. USER FEEDBACK
To gain an understanding of users’ perceptions of GeoPass,
we asked users to answer Likert-scale questions at the end
of both the interference and field studies. We used ten-point
Likert scales, where anchors were included on the ends of
the scale (1 indicating strong disagreement and 10 equaling
strong agreement with the given statement). We reversed some
of the questions to avoid bias. The scores marked with (*) were
reversed before calculating modes, medians, and means. For
all questions, a higher score indicates a more positive result
for GeoPass.
Since Likert-scale data are ordinal, it is most appropriate
to calculate mode and median for Likert-scale responses. For
interested readers, we also report the mean. We say that the
user feedback was positive when the mode and median values
were higher than neutral. We did not get multiple modes in
any case.
Field Study. In the field study, where each participant
had to remember a single geopass, participants showed high
overall satisfaction on the usability (e.g., memorability, ease
of registration and login) of GeoPass (see Table VIII). We
also found positive feedback about the login time of GeoPass.
However, user feedback did not reflect a strong preference for
GeoPass to traditional textual passwords.
Interference Study. In the interference study, participants
had to remember multiple geopasses and the majority of
participants strongly disagreed with the notion that GeoPass
offered good memorability (see Table VIII). The responses
for other usability aspects (e.g., ease of registration and login)
were found to be positive overall. The majority of participants
in the interference study showed strong preference for textual
passwords.
We do not make a direct comparison between these two
studies because of the differences in study design.
TABLE VIII
USER FEEDBACK ON GEOPASS. SCORES ARE OUT OF 10. * INDICATES THAT THE SCALE WAS REVERSED
Questions
Field Study Interference Study
Mode Med Mean SD Mode Med Mean SD
I could easily sign up with GeoPass 9 9 8.6 1.2 10 8.5 7.7 2.9
The login using GeoPass was easy 10 9 8.3 1.6 10 8 7.7 2.6
GeoPass is easy to remember 8 8 8.3 1.3 1 6.5 5.6 3.1
*I found GeoPass too time-consuming 8 7.5 5.9 2.4 7 7 5.7 2.4
(i.e., I found GeoPass less time consuming)
With practice I could quickly enter geopass 10 9 8.6 1.5 10 8 7.6 2.5
*I prefer user-chosen text passwords to GeoPass
6 5 3.9 2.4 1 4.5 3.3 2.8(i.e. I prefer GeoPass to user-chosen text passwords)
VII. SHOULDER-SURFING STUDY
In this section, we discuss the procedure and results of our
study of shoulder surfing in GeoPass. We seek to understand
whether shoulder surfing would be possible to steal users’
login credentials and what aspects of shoulder surfing against
GeoPass are particularly easy or difficult.
A. Study Design
In this study, we recruited 30 participants (7 women, 23
men) from the Computer Security Club, a Computer Security
Class, and a Computer Security Research Lab at our university.
Their mean age was 23. The participants were divided into two
groups (described below), with 15 participants in each group.
The ith and (i + 1)th participants were assigned to different
groups.
1) Procedure: In our study, the experimenter had a one-on-
one session with each user. Written consent was obtained from
each participant before the beginning of study. We showed and
explained GeoPass to the participants and gave an overview of
the shoulder-surfing study. In this study, a participant played
the role of a hacker and the experimenter played the role of
a victim, where the experimenter logged in as a user using a
desktop computer with a 15-inch monitor.
The participants were divided into two groups according to
the method of navigation used by the experimenter to find the
location passwords: the Panning Group and the Typing Group.
In the Panning Group, the experimenter typed the name of the
city in the search bar and then used panning for navigation to
the location-password. For the Typing Group, the experimenter
typed the full address of the geopass in the search bar for direct
navigation to that location without using panning.
In both groups (Panning and Typing), every participant was
asked to perform shoulder surfing twice. For one shoulder-
surfing attempt, the participant was given a pen and paper
to take notes, and for the other shoulder-surfing attempt, she
was provided with a 7-inch A13 Google Android tablet with
the Google map interface (at http://www.maps.google.com)
open for them to mimic the actions of the experimenter on
Google map to gain his location-password. We attempted to
randomize the order of pen and paper versus tablet, but due
to experimental artifacts, the majority of participants used the
tablet first before using pen and paper.
Thus, we get four conditions: the Panning Group using pen
and paper (Pan-P&P), the Panning Group using the tablet
(Pan-Tab), the Typing Group using pen and paper (Typ-P&P),
and the Typing Group using the tablet (Typ-Tab).
For each participant, we used two different geopasses: one
in Sydney, Australia (for pen and paper) and another one in
Cape Town, South Africa (for the tablet). We expect that most
participants would not be familiar with either location.
The experimenter clicked geopasses at zoom level 16 in all
logins and maintained an average login time of 35 seconds for
the first group and 28 seconds for the second group. Note that
the mean login time for GeoPass was 32 seconds in the field
study (see Table II). We let the participants get comfortable
using Google maps on the tablet before the start of the study.
We hypothesized that the tablet would be easier to use to get
precisely the right location.
During shoulder surfing, the participants could stand behind
the experimenter, move to any side, or sit next to him to
gain the geopass. Then they were asked to log in using the
information they had gained through shoulder surfing. For each
participant, the second shoulder-surfing attempt started after
she had completed login attempts with the credentials gained
through the first shoulder-surfing attempt. Each participant was
allowed to make a maximum 10 login attempts. In the post-
experiment anonymous paper-based survey, they were asked
about the ease of shoulder surfing on GeoPass. They were
compensated with a five dollar gift card for participating in
this study.
2) Limitations: Since shoulder surfing is performed by
people who intend to steal authentication secrets, possibly pro-
fessional hackers, recruiting a participant group representing
the true population is very difficult. However, our participants
satisfied the requirements of Tari et al. [29] who stated that
students with reasonable background on computer security
and authentication systems can be representative of “potential
shoulder surfers” in a lab study. We note that for comparisons
between pen and paper and tablet conditions that the majority
of participants used the tablet first.
B. Login Performance
We consider a shoulder-surfing attempt to be successful
when the participant is able to log in successfully with the
TABLE IX
Shoulder-Surfing Study: LOGIN PERFORMANCE
Condition Material
Success Number of attempts Login Time
Rate (%) Mean Med SD Max Min Mean Med SD Max Min
Pan
P&P 60 1.4 1 0.7 3 1 77 73 57 176 25
Tab 33 2 1 1.4 4 1 72 34 74 197 14
Typ P&P 67 2.4 1 3 10 1 124 28 304 987 15
Tab 33 2.4 2 1.5 4 1 88.8 63 62 196 41
Overall 48 2 1 1.9 10 1 94 40 180 987 14
location-password that she gains through shoulder surfing.
Table IX illustrates the results of login performance of the
participants.
1) Success rate: The participants in the Typ-P&P condition
were the most successful with a 67% login success rate, while
the participants in the Pan-P&P condition attained a 60%
success rate. In both the Pan-Tab and Typ-Tab conditions,
the login success rate was 33%. The overall success rate
(considering all conditions) of the shoulder surfers was 48%.
Login success rates are a binary measure. We divide the
pairs into a group for which we have paired results (Pan-
P&P:Pan-Tab and Typ-P&P:Typ-Tab) and a group for which
results are not paired (Pan-P&P:Typ-P&P, Pan-P&P:Typ-Tab,
Pan-Tab:Typ-Tab, and Typ-P&P:Pan-Tab). For the paired re-
sults, we perform McNemar’s tests, while for the unpaired
results, we use chi-squared tests. We found no significant dif-
ferences between any pair of conditions. How a user navigated
to the location-password, by panning or typing, did not impact
the success rate of the attack.
Considering that the success rate was higher for pen-
and-paper conditions, though not statistically significant, we
conclude that our hypothesis that the tablet would be easier to
use for shoulder surfing is not supported by the participants’
performances. We discuss this point further in §VII-D.
2) Number of attempts: In our shoulder-surfing study, the
mean number of attempts required for a successful login was
no greater than 3 in any condition, and the median was 1 in
all conditions except for Typ-Tab, in which case it was 2. In
the Typ-P&P condition, one participant required 10 attempts
to log in successfully. No other participant in any condition
required more than 4 attempts for a successful login.
We do not get matched pairs of subjects while comparing
login times or numbers of attempts for successful logins in
the two study conditions, as a participant might succeed in one
condition and fail in another. Thus, we used a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test and found no significant differences between any
pair of conditions.
3) Login time: The mean and median times for successful
logins were no less than 70 seconds and 28 seconds, respec-
tively, in any condition. One participant required 987 seconds,
which was the maximum login time in any condition, while
the minimum login time for any participant was 14 seconds.
For each pair of conditions, we used a Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test to evaluate the differences in time required for
successful logins. We found that login time for the Typ-P&P
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Fig. 5. Shoulder-Surfing Study: Minimum distances between guessed
locations and actual geopasses for failed logins
condition was significantly less than that for the Typ-Tab
condition (W = 6, p < 0.05), though again we note the
limitation of ordering between the tablet and pen and paper
conditions. No significant difference in login time was found
between any other pair of conditions.
C. Min-Distances for Unsuccesful Logins
In our study, each participant who failed to log in suc-
cessfully made 10 attempts, which was also the maximum
number of attempts allowed. For each unsuccessful participant,
we measured the distances (in kilometers) between the actual
geopass and her selected locations. Then we selected the
closest of these 10 attempts to the actual geopass and recorded
this minimum distance (min-distance).
Figure 5 shows an empirical CDF (ECDF) of min-distances,
where we find that the min-distance was no greater than 0.05
kilometers for 50% of participants in Pan-P&P, 40% in Pan-
Tab, 80% in Typ-P&P, and 10% in Typ-Tab. Overall, 48%
of participants had a min-distance of no greater than 0.05
kilometers. Note that here we consider those participants only
who failed to log in successfully after the maximum number
of allowed attempts.
We do not get matched pairs of subjects while evaluating
the difference in min-distances for failed logins of two study
conditions, so we conducted a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test.
We did not find any significant difference between any pair of
conditions for min-distances.
D. User Opinion and Feedback
We asked the participants to answer a set of ten-point
Likert-scale questions (1 indicating strong disagreement and
10 indicating strong agreement with the given statement) about
TABLE X
Shoulder-Surfing Study: QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSES. SCORES ARE OUT OF 10
Question Mode Med Mean SD Significance Tests
It was very easy to record the person’s geopass with pen and paper 8 8.5 8.2 1.7
V = 304.5, p < 0.01
It was very easy to record the person’s geopass with a tablet 4 5.5 5.3 2.7
It was very easy to select the location from recorded
10 8 7.9 2.1
V = 223.5, p < 0.01
information with pen and paper
It was very easy to select the location from recorded
7 6 5.4 2.5
information with the tablet
I think that it would be easier for professional hackers
10 9.5 8.5 2.1 -
to gain geopass through shoulder surfing
the ease of recording GeoPass through shoulder surfing and
logging in using the recorded information. The results are
shown in Table X.
The majority of participants strongly agreed that it would
be easy for a professional hacker to gain a geopass through
shoulder surfing (mode 10, median 9.5). They generally found
it easy to record the geopass with pen and paper (mode 8,
median 8.5) and then select the location as recorded with pen
and paper (mode 10, median 8).
Most of the participants found shoulder surfing with pen and
paper easier than that with a tablet. We conducted Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests (appropriate for matched pairs of subjects) to
evaluate the differences between pen and paper and tablet in
terms of user feedback on the ease of shoulder surfing using
the corresponding material. We found significant differences
for both ease of recording (V = 304.5, p < 0.01) and
logging in (V = 223.5, p < 0.01). Participants offered a
clear rationale for the distinction: In response to an open-ended
question about their experience, several participants indicated
they could use pen and paper to take notes while looking
at the experimenter’s screen, while using the tablet generally
required looking at the tablet screen.
VIII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we summarize and discuss the findings from
our three independent studies that lead us to our conclusions
about the appropriate applications for GeoPass and areas for
improvement in future research.
A. Summary of findings
Field study. We evaluated the usability of GeoPass in a
real-world setting through a 66-day-long field study including
1781 login sessions from 50 participants. The study shows a
satisfactory memorability for GeoPass with an overall login
success rate of 96.1% when users have to remember a single
geopass.
We analyzed the login performance distribution among users
for a detailed understanding of the usability issues. Our results
show that the median login time for GeoPass was 19 seconds,
and 76% of participants had median login times of 30 seconds
or less. Although login times are long compared to textual
passwords, even users who had to enter their geopass for a
real-world purpose found the login times acceptable.
Since the prior field studies on graphical passwords did
not present a detailed analysis of training effect, it remains
a particular interest of research community to learn how the
login performances change over login sessions in a long-term
field study. Our close examination on training effect found an
overall improvement in login performance with more login
sessions, with some modest fluctuations. For example, the
median login time for GeoPass was 41 seconds in the first
login session, which dropped to 24 seconds by the 13th login
session and then decreased to 17 seconds by the 31st login
session.
Chiasson et al. [30] argued that the login success rate in
a lab study would be higher than that in a field study since
the participants in a lab setting get primarily focused on their
login attempts, but in a field study the authentication is usually
a secondary task. Indeed, we found that the login success rate
was 84% in the first login session, which is less than the study
by Thorpe et al. [9]3 The training effect, however, compensated
for this, leading to a 94% success rate at the 7th login session
and a 100% success rate at the 13th login session.
Lockout rules [25] are implemented for many online ac-
counts to ensure high security. To implement a lockout rule
that is both secure and convenient for legitimate users, it
is important to figure out the number of attempts an actual
user would usually require to log in successfully. Our field
study gives insight to this issue, as we found that 90%
of participants made at most two attempts on average to
authenticate successfully, and 100% of participants logged in
successfully within five attempts on average. Thus, GeoPass
is amenable to reasonable lockout rules.
Interference study. While the short-term lab study [9] and
our field study found satisfactory memorability for a single
geopass, we conducted an interference study to evaluate the
login performance for multiple geopasses. We found that using
multiple geopasses led to a significant interference effect that
hurt memorability, where the overall login success rates were
58% in login 1 (one week after registration) and 67% in login
2 (two weeks after registration).
A comprehensive survey [8] on 25 graphical password
schemes reported that only three of these schemes have
been evaluated through the interference study: Passfaces [24],
3We note that direct comparison between different studies should be taken
with caution.
Passpoints [11, 30], and VIP [31]. The studies [11, 24, 30, 31]
showed the memorability for multiple graphical passwords,
and reported the interference effect through comparing to a
single password [30] or presenting different distracting condi-
tions [24]. None of these studies [11, 24, 30, 31] demonstrated,
however, the precise impact of interference. In particular, they
did not distinguish the login attempts that failed because
of confusion with other passwords (i.e. likely interference)
from attempts that failed due to simply forgetting the desired
password (i.e., non-interference).
In our study, we provide a clear distinction between in-
terference and non-interference, which reveals that 44.8% of
attempts in login 1 and 38.2% of attempts in login 2 failed
because of interference effects. We investigated both accurate
and non-accurate interferences for an in-depth analysis of
interference effects. As noted by Biddle et al. [8], how to
best evaluate multiple password interference still remains an
open issue; our methodology for analyzing interference effect
should make an important contribution in this regard.
Our investigation on the cause of interference suggests that
the participants did not seem confused by geopasses that were
geographically close, since the interference effect between a
pair of geopasses had no correlation with the distance between
them. It remains unclear why interference occurs. Perhaps
with more experience, users would learn how to associate the
account with the geopass, much as they associate accounts
with textual passwords today. Studies are needed to see if
this is the case, for GeoPass as well as graphical and other
schemes.
While prior studies [32] showed the effectiveness of printed
password advice in a lab setting, it would be of significant
interest to see how the participants react to verbal password
advice from security researchers while they create an au-
thentication secret. We examined the issue in both real-life
scenario (field study) and lab setting (interference study). At
the beginning of studies, we verbally gave a simple secu-
rity suggestion to the participants that choosing their home,
school, or workplace as geopasses may make their credentials
vulnerable to targeted guessing attacks. However, we found
that 44.9% of geopasses in field study and 44.5% of location-
passwords in interference study represent their home, school
or workplaces. Our findings give a primary indication that the
verbal security suggestions, even from security personnel, may
not be sufficient to restrain users from creating predictable au-
thentication secrets. Further studies are required to investigate
this issue in greater detail.
Shoulder-surfing study. The findings from our shoulder-
surfing study indicate that GeoPass is not resilient against this
attack, with a 48% overall success rate for participants playing
the role of attackers. We closely examined the attempts of
participants who failed to log in successfully to understand
their possibilities in an alternate scenario. Our analysis sug-
gests that if the unsuccessful participants were allowed more
login attempts the success rate could further increase, since
their clicked locations were very close to the actual geopass
in several cases. As shown by our results, overall 48% of
participants who failed to log in successfully had their best
attempt within 0.05 kilometers of the actual geopass. We also
note that a resourceful and experienced attacker could be more
successful in such cases.
Using the Google map interface on a tablet to mimic the
navigation of a user to her location-password represents a tech-
savvy method for recording geopass, while pen and paper
is traditionally used in shoulder surfing studies to record
credentials. Our study showed that the participants preferred
pen and paper to using a tablet as they could easily take notes
with pen and paper while looking at the experimenter’s screen.
For an authentication scheme, it is of particular interest to
the research community to see how the user behavior during
login affects the risk of observation attacks (e.g., shoulder
surfing). To explore deeper into the issue, we analyzed the
impact of navigation strategies on shoulder surfing, and we
found that how a user navigated to the location-password,
either by panning or typing the full address, did not affect
the success rate of the attack.
The success rate of university students in our shoulder-
surfing study raises a red flag for not only geographical
location-password schemes, but also for any graphical pass-
word schemes with mouse input [5–7, 21, 33], and shoulder-
surfing studies should be conducted on them before deploy-
ment.
B. Application of GeoPass
In light of our findings, we believe that GeoPass is not
yet mature enough for broad commercial deployment and
demands careful attention from the research community to
offer higher memorability for multiple location-passwords and
better resilience against shoulder-surfing attacks.
In its current state, GeoPass may be deployed in limited
conditions, such as for the authentication of employees in an
internal system where a user remembers a single geopass and
usually authenticates in an environment with limited risk of
shoulder surfing.
Because of the dangers of shoulder surfing and the relatively
long time for a login session, GeoPass may be best suited
as a backup authentication mechanism for password resets.
The high memorability for a single geopass may make it a
good alternative to security questions, assuming that the issue
of interference is addressed. Further research is needed to
evaluate GeoPass for such an application based on longer-term
recall.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a systematic approach to perform
a comprehensive study on an authentication scheme to reveal
the usability and security issues that need to be addressed
before commercial deployment. We applied this approach to
study GeoPass, a scheme that had been shown to have good us-
ability properties and resilience to guessing. Our results show
that GeoPass, while offering good real-world usability, suffers
from interference issues and vulnerability to shoulder surfing.
We have denoted the practical applications for GeoPass in its
current state and identified the issues that need to be addressed
in future research for wide-scale deployment of digital-map-
based authentication schemes.
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